



**PROSPECTS FOR AFRICA –
EUROPE'S POLICIES**

The VENRO Project on the
Africa-EU Partnership

Adaption to Climate Change in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and the Copenhagen Climate Summit

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Preface

Africa is seen as a continent particularly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change. This was also recognised in the Bali Action Plan agreed in Bali in 2007, which serves as a key basis for the current United Nations (UN) climate negotiations culminating in the Copenhagen climate summit. The majority of the African countries will most likely not achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and climate change is a factor increasingly undermining development efforts. More frequent droughts and sudden floods have repeatedly devastated parts of the continent and undermined the livelihoods of millions of people.

At the same time, the European Union (EU) is the second most important contributor to global climate change through its accumulated emissions. Thus, it has a particular responsibility to reduce its emissions and at the same time, as a matter of equity, to assist affected countries with their efforts to adapt to the consequences of climate change. While the EU sees itself as having the leadership in

the current UN climate negotiations, mixed signals were also given last year that question this leadership role. The EU is the most important donor of Official Development Assistance (ODA) world-wide, too, where co-operation with Africa, also increasingly on climate change, plays an important role.¹

Co-operation with Europe's neighbouring continent Africa entered into a new era with the adoption of the Joint EU-Africa Strategy (JAES) in Lisbon in December 2007. This paper analyses key aspects and progress achieved with regard to the Africa-EU Partnership on Climate Change, including an outlook to the Copenhagen Climate summit. It also provides some conclusions and recommendations developed by civil society on how both partners should step up their efforts for an effective response to the threat of climate change, with the EU holding crucial responsibilities in assisting Africa in its adaptation efforts.

Climate change challenges Africa's development prospects

The release of the 4th Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was a turning point in recent debates on climate change. The report clearly stated that impacts of anthropogenic climate change were already occurring across the globe, and that the prospects in case of unmitigated climate change would be devastating for hundreds of millions of people. The report also outlined some specific findings for Africa, with a scientific certainty level of very high confidence.² These include a) that Africa is one of the continents most vulnerable to climate change and climate variability; b) that agricultural production and food security (including access to food) in many African countries and regions will likely be severely compromised by Climate Change and climate variability; c) that Climate Change will aggravate the water stress currently faced by some countries, while some countries not at risk today will be prone to water stress in the future; and d) that human

health, already compromised by a range of factors, could also be further negatively impacted by climate change and climate variability (e.g. malaria in Southern Africa and the Eastern African highlands). Finally, the impacts of climate change are feared to increasingly contribute to conflicts, and various African regions face a significant conflict risk due to climate change. Since then, numerous scientific findings have clearly shown that it is more likely than not that the level and speed of climate change have been underestimated by the scenarios that provided the basis for the 4th Assessment Report. A recent report concluded that the world is heading for a temperature increase of up to 7°C this century, if continuing on the emission pathways of the last few years.³

1. See e.g. Harmeling et al., 2007

2. Boko et al., 2007

3. Allison et al., 2009

Adaptation to climate change in Africa: options and costs

There is no doubt that the need for adaptive responses to the challenge of climate variability and climate change has increasingly gained attention from policy-makers, development practitioners and affected stakeholders since the release of the 4th Assessment Report. According to the IPCC, “the covariant mix of climate stresses and other factors in Africa means that for many in Africa adaptation is not an option, but a necessary compulsion”. Given the existing development deficits in several African countries, sustainable poverty reduction is still of utmost importance for development. By reducing vulnerability, it can also contribute to an increase in the adaptive capacity of the people. Research shows that in many cases, adaptation strategies discussed can bring about synergies with efforts to achieve the MDGs.⁴ This is very important in order to develop integrated strategies of “adaptive development”.

Strategies of adaptation already observed in Africa include diversification of livelihood activities, institutional architecture, adjustments in farming operations, income-generation projects and selling of labour.⁵ Table 1 gives an overview of possible adaptation strategies. The development of community based adaptation projects (CBA) is of special importance. Particularly the poor urban and rural population suffer very much from political and economic marginalisation and/or from its high degree of dependence on economic activities, which may be affected by climate change. Therefore, the vulnerable communities should generally be the principal recipient of adaptation actions and be in the focus of national and regional adaptation planning and policies, also as a human rights based obligation for developing countries, in particular where human rights such as the right to adequate food and water are threatened by climate change.⁶

It should be noted that “incorporating indigenous knowledge into climate change policies can lead to the development of effective adaptation strategies that are cost-effective, participatory, and sustainable”.⁷ Furthermore, it is important that the “community-based adaptation recognizes that environmental knowledge; vulnerability and resilience to climate impacts are embedded in societies and cultures. This means the focus is on empowering communities to themselves, as to take action based on their own decision-making processes.” Nevertheless, the IPCC already underlined that “African farmers have developed several adaptation options to cope with current climate variability but such adaptations may not be sufficient for future changes of climate”.⁸

This underscores two priorities: on the one hand it is necessary to limit global warming by reducing greenhouse gas emissions globally as much as possible, to prevent dangerous climate change and inter alia to avoid large-scale climate risks such as the so-called “tipping elements”. On the other hand, it requires substantially increased efforts to reduce the general vulnerability of people and scale-up planned adaptation on different scales and levels. An increasing number of research and implementation activities on adaptation are taking place in different parts of the African continent, to better understand the issue, to define priorities and to test approaches.

It is a fact that climate change leaves Africa with an additional development and financial burden to which it contributed only very little.

As shown in Table 1, the costs of climate change may grow to up to ten per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), in a 4°C scenario. Recent estimates by the World Bank suggest that the additional costs of adaptation to climate change may be in the order of USD 18 billion annually as an average over the next 40 years in Sub-Sahara Africa, gradually rising from about twelve billion in the first decade to 24 billion from 2040 to 2050.⁸ This comes as a share of African GDP of about 0.7 per cent on average for a scenario which limits global warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. This objective has also been advocated by the EU and other developed countries, which, however, does not mean that it results in a safe world. There will already be severe humanitarian consequences at that level of climate change, as they are already occurring now, where the world has only warmed about 0.8°C above pre-industrial levels. Overall, financing for investment as well as capacity-building and technologies thus must be seen as a key constraint for successful adaptation on a broader scale in Africa. Priority fields of action include improvements in systematic observation of climate variability and climate change, impact and vulnerability assessments on different scales, and adaptation planning and implementation in different, vulnerable sectors (agriculture, water, ecosystems, energy) and in cross-sectoral approaches.

4. Columbia University, 2006

5. Boko et al., 2007

6. See Bread for the World/Germanwatch, 2008

7. Boko et al., 2007

8. World Bank, 2009

Table 1: Summary of possible climate change impacts in Africa, adaptation strategies and cost ranges

°C rise	1.5 °C	2 °C	4 °C
Key Impacts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Potential yield increases in East Africa and the highlands; reductions in the Sahel. Potential increases in net revenue for small livestock farms; losses for large farms. Twelve million people could be at risk from hunger. Fisheries could be negatively affected by drought. Widespread coral bleaching could occur on Indian Ocean coasts. Possible increases in exposure to malaria of 0–17 per cent; diarrhoea of -0.1–16 per cent and increased inland flood deaths of 0–127 per cent. Increased flooding resulting in damage to infrastructure and property. Water stress increases, particularly in North Africa. Up to 15 per cent of Sub-Saharan species could be at risk of extinction. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Potential crop yield increases in highland areas; significant reductions in Southern Africa. Potential increase in net revenue for small livestock farms, losses for large farms. Net revenue loss to agricultural sector could be as much as USD 133 billion, about 4.7 per cent of Africa’s total GDP. An additional 55 million people could be at risk from hunger. Water stress could affect between 350–600 million more people. Increases in malaria transmission and exposure are possible. Up to 40 per cent of species in Sub-Saharan Africa could be at risk from extinction. Flooding in coastal areas could cause around US-Dollar 50 billion worth of damage. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Anticipated drops in wheat, maize and rice crops in some areas. Increased risk of hunger among up to 128 million more people. Higher risk of flooding in low-lying areas. Potential increases in net revenue for small livestock farms, losses for large farms. Malaria transmission area could double in South Africa by 2100. Increased water stress, particularly in northern and southern Africa. Rainfall could increase in eastern Africa.
Adaptation Strategies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regional agreements to enforce environmental and animal protection laws. Promoting agro-ecological approaches to farming. Support to smallholders, including micro-credit finance, improved seed varieties, drought-tolerant stock and fertilisers, veterinary services, access to appropriate technologies for irrigation systems and training in improved soil and water management techniques via outreach extension services. Reforestation schemes. Regulations on fossil fuels intensive chemical inputs. Improving water storage and distribution technologies, establishing user associations and payment and compensation schemes for fair distribution of water and natural resources. Improved climate monitoring and forecasting. Disaster prevention and response plans. Coastal protection measures. Retrofitting or relocating infrastructure, development of building guidelines. Investments in health services, including education programmes, surveillance systems, staff training and preventative measures. Introducing energy efficiency policy and decentralised off-grid renewable energy systems for rural areas. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support to the agriculture sector, particularly smallholders, including improved crop varieties, drought-tolerant livestock, fertilisers and farming technology measures, such as irrigation. Additional water stress may require larger-scale interventions, such as water basin transfers and exploitation of groundwater supplies. Coastal protection measures. Explicit conflict mitigation efforts and peace-building where necessary. Energy efficiency and on-grid power extension to build human and industrial resilience in urban areas. Capacity building in the health sector. Biodiversity rehabilitation and conservation efforts scaled up with tighter regulations on natural resource use. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Building the resilience of the agricultural sector still crucial. Measures as before, potentially on larger scale. Reinforcement or relocation of industries, infrastructure and human settlements via coastal protection measures.
Cost Ranges With Adaptation	Minimum USD10 billion a year by 2030, and up to USD 30 billion a year, directly in response to climate change.		
Cost Ranges Without Adaptation	1.7 per cent of Africa’s total GDP	3.4 per cent of total GDP	10 per cent of total GDP

Source: PACJA, 2009

Africa in the run-up to Copenhagen: A continent unites

Against this background, it is not surprising that the policy profile of climate change as a threat faced jointly by almost all African countries has sharpened, particularly since the Nairobi climate change conference in 2006 (COP 12). But it has only recently led to a unification of African governments in the run-up to Copenhagen, through a number of specific meetings and declarations. In February 2009, the Heads of African governments agreed on the “Algiers Declaration on Climate Change” as their common position. In an August summit of the African Union, a committee of ten African Heads of States and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC) was formed, chaired by the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who is to represent Africa in Copenhagen. While the Heads of States have focused more on high-level messages around Africa’s expectation towards Copenhagen, the meetings of African environment ministers have elaborated a more detailed agreement, and adopted the following key positions at their recent meeting in Addis Ababa (20th October 2009):

On a principal basis, it was agreed that

1. “Africa should be equitably compensated, in the context of environmental justice, for damage to environmental resources and

economic and social losses attributable to the historic responsibility of developed countries for climate change.

2. Africa recognises the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and reaffirms its principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and that these should form the basis for the post-2012 regime. Given the uncertainties about the impacts that climate change is having, Africa’s adaptation measures should be based on the precautionary principle.

With regard to adaptation, the African position is as follows⁹:

- A. Adaptation for Africa is the highest priority;
- B. Africa, as the lowest greenhouse gas emitter and yet the most vulnerable continent, has the right to receive full support for its efforts to adapt to climate change;
- C. The provision of financial, technological and capacity building support by developed country Parties for adaptation in developing countries is a commitment under the Convention that must be urgently fulfilled, recognising that climate change is an additional burden to sustainable development and a threat to the attainment of the MDGs.

In the provision of financial support, which is the key means to ultimately scale-up adaptation with the ambition required, “a financial commitment of at least 1.5 per cent of global GDP of developed countries (as set down by IPCC in its 2007 report) is required, to support and enable adaptation and mitigation actions in developing countries”.¹⁰ With this figure, the bar is set quite high for developed countries, demanding around USD 500 billion for all developing countries. Nevertheless, it should be noted that although the IPCC report is referred to, it is not clear precisely where this figure is derived from, since scanning the IPCC report does not reveal such a figure. It is higher than, for example, what the group of G77 and China, to which all African countries belong, has demanded (0.5 to 1 per cent of developed countries’ GDP) in the context of the UN climate negotiations. Interestingly, only six months ago, the adaptation-related positions of the African group submitted in the UNFCCC process demanded USD 67 billion per year specifically for adaptation.¹¹

This support should come, in accordance with the Bali Action Plan, as “new, additional, sustainable, accessible and predictable finance for a comprehensive international programme on adaptation, which reduces vulnerability and increases resilience to impacts that are already occurring, and to impacts that are likely to occur in the future”. Addressing the nexus between failure in mitigation and increased demand for adaptation as well as more severe loss

and damages of climate change, the African governments recognise the increased science urgency by demanding from developed countries that they “reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020 and at least 80–95 per cent below 1990 levels by 2050, in order to achieve the lowest level of stabilisation assessed by the IPCC in its fourth assessment report”.¹³

In the last session of the climate change negotiations before Copenhagen held in Barcelona in November, the African Group also showed that they were serious about their demands when they demonstratively left a negotiating session under the Kyoto Protocol complaining about the lack of ambition in mitigating greenhouse gas emissions by developed countries. The Ethiopian Prime Minister also repeatedly underlined determination to veto and delegitimise any global climate change agreement that is not consistent with Africa’s minimal position, particularly on financial support (this minimal position is not yet publicly defined).¹³

9. AMCEN, 2009

10. AMCEN, 2009

11. African Group, 2009

12. AMCEN, 2009

13. See <http://en.cop15.dk/news/view+news?newsid=2022>

Climate change in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy

The JAES and its action plans, which were adopted in Lisbon in December 2007, were meant to redefine the nature of the relationship between Africa and Europe. The strategy was an answer to the geopolitical connection of both continents and the challenge of globalisation and was intended to speed up the process of integration between Africa and Europe. With this common strategy, the political dialogue is to be developed between the EU and Africa so that it exceeds the current stage of pure development co-operation and is extended to all political issues and questions with a common interest. Then JAES should grow beyond Africa as a continent and not remain a strategy purely focused on “African” questions. For the purpose of equality, it should discuss European and even world-wide subjects. In addition,

the JAES should overcome the split support for African engagements in its quest for regional and world-wide solutions to the most important challenges, as well as better integrate African and European citizens into a strategic partnership and thus contribute to the strengthening of the civil societies of both continents. After the approval of the principal standards for the common strategy by the 8th Africa-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting the strategy was passed during the second Lisbon summits EU/Africa. The JAES focuses on four political aims: i) The strengthening of the partnership, so that it becomes a real partnership between equals; ii) The support of central development-political questions; iii) Common action to overcome global challenges, i.e. the climate change; and iv) The relief and support of a broadly



invested and far-reaching partnership by which the human being stands in the centre.

In order to implement the Joint Africa-EU Strategy more concretely, eight partnerships were agreed upon, among them the partnership on climate change with the priority actions to a) Build a common agenda on climate change policies and co-operation, and b) address land degradation and increasing aridity, including the 'Green Wall for the Sahara' initiative. Obviously, the priority action a) is most relevant to the current political negotiation context in the context of Copenhagen, while b) it serves as a concrete initiative to respond to climate change and desertification. This paper will only take a closer look at priority action a).

The first action plan to implement this partnership further specifies the expectations towards this co-operation from the African side, including:

- Strengthening of the dialogue between Africa and the EU regarding the development, transformation and continuation as well as improvement of the initiatives and the contracts on climate change, and transparency in treating a constructive agreement, which will consider the interests of Africa for the period after 2012.
- Systematic consideration of adaptation to the results of climate change as a column of the MDGs.
- Strengthening of the adaptive capacity of African countries to climate change by a competent risk administration, which would prepare the early warning of the people, in order to help to decrease the negative effects of climate change.
- Improvement of assessment and analysis of the methods of local climate data by science centres and by the already available infrastructure for managing the climatic risks at all levels.
- Support in reducing the deforestation and improving the preservation of the forest ecological systems by creating alternatives to protect the livelihoods of the affected local population.

Two years after the Lisbon summit, and shortly before the Copenhagen climate summit, it is important to take stock of what the Africa-EU partnership on climate change has achieved so far, focusing here on aspects relevant to the UNFCCC negotiations.

The politically most relevant event and outcome was the Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Climate Change, which was adopted immediately ahead of the 2008 UNFCCC Climate conference, which was held in Poznan, Poland. The joint press release saw the agreement as a "proof of the convergence between the two continents despite the significant

socio-economic differences separating them. This tends to prove that on a more global scale, great alliances are possible in the face of the emergency that is global warming."¹⁴

On substance, the declaration both included concrete provisions on the desired outcome of the Copenhagen process and outlined specific fields of co-operation from both sides. For example, there was agreement that both Africa and the EU would work together to speed up the operationalisation of the Adaptation Fund established under the Kyoto Protocol while seeking to mobilise new and additional funding for adaptation. Indeed, there was substantial progress on that matter in Poznan in 2008 as well as throughout 2009.¹⁵ The importance of capacity-building for adaptation as well as and mitigation was underlined by both partners, including for the UNFCCC negotiations. There is no doubt that capacity-building is crucial to preparing developing countries to successfully cope with the challenge of climate change, beyond single projects.

The declaration also touched upon issues of the financial support and financial architecture debated under the UNFCCC. Not surprisingly, it did not mention any figures on financial support, since the EU back then was far away from having an agreed position. What was surprising was that the declaration contained a relatively clear statement on the role of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) as the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, while the GEF has often been criticised by developing countries as being too slow and too little responsive to their needs. Because of that they have proposed a substantially reformed financial mechanism, where the role of the GEF would likely be much smaller.¹⁶ Furthermore, this statement somehow blurred the fact that the GEF is only an operating entity of the financial mechanism, as per the UNFCCC, and not the financial mechanism itself (this difference is not even adequately understood within the EU). Now, for example, the Adaptation Fund Board, managing the Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol, is also on its way to becoming an operating entity.¹⁷

14. African Union/EU, 2008

15. See Chandani, Harmeling and Kaloga, 2009

16. G77 and China, 2008

17. See Kaloga and Harmeling, 2009

How to drive Copenhagen when there is a lack of trust?

However, since that joint declaration, there has been little impetus by this partnership on the negotiations, partially because those responsible for moving the partnership forward, in particular on the EU side, were neither closely involved in the UNFCCC negotiations nor have they been a driving force to exploit further potential for building up a strategic alliance with African countries. But this is also due to some significant divergence in the positions of the two country groups and a lack of trust on both sides.

Lack of trust from Africa: The EU's insufficient level of ambition and unfulfilled commitments

First, the lack of trust from the African side can simply be described as concerns regarding the lack of ambition on the part of the EU, both with regard to mitigation as well as finance. While the African Group demands that developed countries reduce their emissions by 40 per cent by 2020 (compared to 1990) – the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), of which many are African countries, even demand "at least 45 per cent" – the EU so far has only offered 30 per cent in the case of a new international climate change agreement, tied to some further conditions on the quality of other countries' commitments. Furthermore, analyses show that this may only result in additional domestic mitigation of 4.5 to 10 per cent, if all possible external emission reduction credits and greenhouse gas sinks are included. Thus, the level of ambition is less than the EU often pretends.

Second, the EU's (only recently determined) position on the financial offer to developing countries lags far behind the African demand. The EU acknowledged a potential finance demand out of a Copenhagen agreement in the order of Euro 100 billion of additional costs for adaptation and mitigation, of which the major share would be covered by the carbon market and contributions from developing countries themselves. The public finance demand offered by the EU for adaptation is suggested as Euro 10 to 24 billion for all developed countries, but with a priority for those which are most vulnerable. The EU is also clear in stating that this includes most of the African countries.

Thirdly, the history of unfulfilled promises impacts on the level of trust in the UNFCCC negotiations, too. One example is that of the developed countries' commitment to provide 0.7 per cent of their Gross National Income to developing countries as Official Development Assistance, which is more than 30 years old and has only been fulfilled

by very few countries. Another one is linked to the National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA) process. Least Developed Countries are supported under the umbrella of the UNFCCC to prepare NAPAs, a process which was initiated in 2001. Now, most of the LDCs have delivered their NAPAs, and many of them have identified priority projects as demanded. The overall costs required for implementation of these NAPA projects amount to roughly USD 1.5 to 2 billion. So far, only USD 170 million has been paid into the Fund that was specifically created for this purpose. The Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) has been paid into by developed countries as a whole, and only a few projects are already receiving money from the Global Environment Facility, which operates the LDCF. So there is a big funding gap. Even the NAPAs are only about the most urgent needs. Many governments have highlighted that they have benefited a lot from the NAPA process.

Lack of trust on the part of the EU: how to ensure that adaptation funding is used for its intended purpose?

On the EU side, there is the general concern that adaptation funding delivered to developing countries may not be used for its intended purpose, which might significantly undermine the willingness to pay in developed countries. While acknowledging that adaptation priorities can only be defined and decided within developing countries, the EU also expects that the resources be used particularly to address the adaptation needs of the most vulnerable people and sectors. And they require a reliable monitoring and evaluation system. These aspects are often countered in the UNFCCC negotiations by developing countries, including African countries, with the argument that adaptation finance is about compensation for damage done through the emissions, and thus no kind of conditionalities imposed by those who contribute the resources should be accepted.

However, it is important to note that there are two ways of understanding compensation: the one is the literal meaning of the word which implies that the recipient of the compensatory payment is free to use the money for whatever he wants. The other way of understanding it is as restitution money, where recipients are entitled to receive the money because of the damage done, but the contributors can reasonably expect that the money is used for the intended and logical purpose, namely to respond to the damage and



to reduce its impacts.¹⁸ And the latter understanding is clearly the appropriate one which binds African governments to use adaptation funding for adaptation. An additional dimension explains why a focus on the particularly vulnerable people within countries can legitimately be demanded, which is the rights-based approach to adaptation and which is characterised by the following conclusion of a recent report prepared by Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights:

“In sum, irrespective of the additional strain climate change-related events may place on available resources, States remain under an obligation to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights under any given circumstances. Importantly, States must, as a matter of priority, seek to satisfy core obligations and protect groups in society who are in a particularly vulnerable situation.”¹⁹ Interestingly, over the last couple of months, African governments have made statements which somehow suggest that they understand this concern.

- The group of Least Developed Countries, of which many are African countries, demanded that “adaptation actions must therefore focus on enhancing resilience of developing countries at various levels, including communities, local and central governments and national economy”.²⁰
- The African Group demanded as a principle to “address the concerns of all vulnerable groups whose adaptive capacity is low, and in particular gender and youth concerns, recognizing that women and children are particularly affected by the impacts of climate change”.²¹

Furthermore, the African Environment ministers in the “2009 Nairobi Declaration on the Africa Process for Combating Climate Change” stressed that “Africa’s priorities are to implement climate change programmes with a focus on adaptation in such a way as to achieve sustainable develop-

ment [...], with emphasis on the most vulnerable groups, especially women and children”. Additionally, the ministers called for the “involvement of women, young people and persons with disabilities [...] to ensure an effective African response to climate change”.²²

Finally it has to be mentioned that all Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, including many countries from the African continent, adopted as a strategic priority of the Adaptation Fund in 2008 that “in developing projects and programmes de-veloping countries shall give particular attention to the needs of the most vulnerable communities”.²³

Thus, there are commitments by African governments to build on which are quite relevant to a targeted and rights-based use of adaptation funding. The negotiations on a Copenhagen agreement have not yet seen a concrete proposal, neither from developing nor from developed countries, on how such a priority can be implemented best. At least the recent UNFCCC non-paper 53, which is a product of the negotiating process, still contains a paragraph that in the provision of support priority should be given to particularly vulnerable sectors, people, groups, communities and ecosystems.²⁴ Nevertheless, it is bracketed, which means that it is not yet agreed. However, it would be an important link on which further elaboration of modalities could be based. Further clarification is needed of how to monitor and evaluate supported adaptation actions in this regard.

18. See Mueller and Gomez-Echeverri, 2009

19. OHCHR, 2009

20. LDCs, 2009

21. African Group, 2009

22. AMCEN, 2009:

23. UNFCCC, 2008: 1/CMP.4

24. FCCC/AWG/LCA/2009/14, <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca7/eng/14.pdf> VENRO, 2009

A civil society view on the Africa-EU Partnership on climate change

Not only does the Africa-EU Strategy give civil society a specific role, it is clear that civil society co-operation on climate change is also crucial, in terms of practical implementation as well as regarding political engagement inter alia in the UNFCCC negotiations. Given the importance of co-operation on climate change across borders, there is no doubt that the Africa-EU partnership on climate change could play an important role in developing effective responses to the multiple challenge of climate change. A joint working group of African and European civil society organisations in the context of the VENRO project “Africa’s prospects – Europe’s policies” paid particular attention to this relationship and identified among others the following aspects as conducive to an effective partnership²⁵:

- Increased African-EU co-operation and co-ordination can facilitate the Copenhagen process;
- The expectations regarding the EU build on its legal commitments under the UNFCCC but also on the partnership process that has been initiated through the Joint Africa EU Strategy;
- African and European CSOs take climate change serious and see a contribution of this partnership to an ambitious climate change agreement as crucial;
- It is not acceptable that EU countries cut down ODA in times of an economic crisis that is strongly hitting the poorest countries; commitments must be delivered in addition to more climate change financing;
- Exchange, synergies and coherence between other external policy areas, also in the Africa-EU partnership process, should be promoted and intensified.

So far, however, the Africa EU partnership on climate change has delivered too limited additional value to what is needed. Additional activities on both sides have been recommended in order to build up trust and to bridge gaps, since eventually both country groups seek an ambitious Copenhagen outcome, which is of essential relevance to the development prospects of Africa.

For the EU, it is recommended that it

- more actively supports the rapid implementation of the NAPAs, disaster preparedness and other urgent measures through ad-

ditional resources provided for near-term action, ideally before Copenhagen, in addition to ODA commitments, since funding the NAPAs must be seen as an old promise rather than as a bargaining chip;

- works for more ambition and coherence in fund management in a future climate change regime, including a strong role of the UNFCCC, and raises additional resources in particular through auctioning AAUs (Norwegian proposal), possibly connected with the Mexican proposal, which identifies an “effort-sharing” through the adoption of a formula operationalising the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities;
- increasingly assists African countries in integrating the long-term climate change challenge into development planning, through exchange in experience and financial support.
- With regard to the responsibility of African governments, they are expected to
- pay particular attention to most vulnerable people and communities when preparing proposals to the Adaptation Fund, and when implementing adaptation programmes (also with other funds), with meaningful inclusion of civil society;
- do their homework in integrating adaptation into development, but also with regard to making use of traditional knowledge and technologies existing in their countries/regions;
- build on existing experience/lessons learnt and activities, including from other Conventions/sectors etc.

The UNFCCC Copenhagen agreement should also address the importance of global, regional and national centres/networks for knowledge sharing and weather/climate observations and help to expand and improve the activities in Africa. Generally, any Copenhagen agreement which does not significantly step up efforts to support adaptation to climate change in Africa would be a failure and also a human rights violation by those who are responsible for the problem. The EU has to play a key role here. Nevertheless, both Partners have to build up trust to deliver on the effective implementation of adaptation for those who are most in need, the most vulnerable people and communities.

25. VENRO, 2009

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* Guest members



VENRO is the umbrella organisation of development non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Germany. The organisation was founded in 1995 and consists of around 120 organisations. Their backgrounds lie in independent and church-related development co-operation, humanitarian aid as well as development education, public relations and advocacy. 16 one-world networks are part of VENRO. These represent about 2,000 local development initiatives and NGOs. VENRO's central goal is to create fair globalisation, with a special emphasis on eradicating global poverty. The organisation is committed to implementing human rights and conserving natural resources.

VENRO

- represents the interests of development NGOs vis-à-vis the government
- strengthens the role of NGOs and civil society in development co-operation
- engages in advocacy for the interests of developing countries and the poorer segments of society
- sharpens public awareness of development co-operation issues



Following the motto "Observing, Analysing, Acting", Germanwatch has been actively promoting global equity and the preservation of livelihoods since 1991. In doing so, we focus on the politics and economics of the North with their world-wide consequences. The situation of marginalised people in the South is the starting point of our work. Together with our members and supporters as well as with other actors in civil society, we intend to represent a strong lobby for sustainable development. We endeavour to approach our aims by advocating the prevention of dangerous climate change, fair trade relations, responsible financial markets and compliance with human rights. Germanwatch is funded by membership fees, donations, grants from the Stiftung Zukunftsfähigkeit (Foundation for Sustainability), and by grants from a number of other public and private donors.



With the project "Prospects for Africa – Europe's Policies", VENRO seeks to make an active civil society contribution to the implementation of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership. The project builds on co-operation with African partners that began during VENRO's successful EU Presidency Project in 2007. VENRO member organisations then worked together with their African partners to develop statements for policy-makers, the media and the interested public on the main topics of the project: energy and climate policies; regional integration and trade; and gender.

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